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This article presents an incremental and 
scalable solution for tracing Denial of Service (DoS) and 
Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. Our approach allows 
the victim to identify the network paths traversed by 
attack traffic without requiring the support from ISP or 
knowledge of the network topology. In contrast to 
previous probabilistic packet marking work, our 
approach has no false positive and fixed computation 
overhead for the victim to reconstruct the attack paths. 
Furthermore, the volume of attack packets required to 
reconstruct the attack path is dramatically less.  
 
1. Introduction 
The current Internet infrastructure provides 
connectivity to millions of computers worldwide. The 
core Internet was designed to operate under the spirit of 
trustworthiness among computers. However, it was not 
designed to withstand different kinds of cyber attacks that 
are prevalent today. The ubiquitous connectivity provided 
by the Internet has made it a primary mechanism to 
perpetuate various attacks on the critical host computers. 
Examples of significant attacks include Code Red [1] 
launching Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and 
Slammer attacking Bank of America’s ATM network in 
January 2003. The goal of cyber forensic includes 
monitoring, and identification of cyber criminals. 
There are many techniques proposed in the literature 
to address prevention and detection of different types of 
attacks in wired and wireless networks [2, 3]. Relatively 
little attention has been focused on the identification and 
prosecution of attacks. Locating a source of attack will 
not only help identify criminals but also could prevent 
information stolen including identity theft, intellectual 
property theft etc. A typical attack [4] model is shown in 
Figure 1. In this case an intruder initiates an attack by 
contacting next level of hosts termed as stepping stone 1 
to 4. Stepping-stone illustrates the compromised nodes 
that are used as an attack channel while hiding the 
attacker. Stepping-stones could change the inter-packet 
delay to avoid detection through causality relation 
mapping between in and out packets. The actual attack 
packets may travel through several stepping-stones to 
hide the identity of attacker(s) before reaching the victim. 
The identity of an attacker could be further disguised by 
the use of one or more zombie nodes. A stepping-stone 
could install a Trojan-horse on zombie nodes that could 
initiate DDOS attack some time in future. In this manner 
the attacker may not be easily identified through simple 
causality relationship mapping between packets. In this 
case zombie of stepping stone could spoof the identity of 
the victim and send packets to a forwarding node (shown 
in Figure 1), while the uncompromised forwarding node 
which is not the actual attacker, sends the packet forward 
to the victim. In this case the forwarding node is not the 
actual attacker. The attacker could initiate an attack by 
selecting stepping-stones in different geographical 
locations on the Internet making the identification of the 


















Figure 1. Generic attack configuration 
 
Figure 2 depicts a simple network from attackers to 
victim, routers are presented by Ri, possible attackers are 
presented by Ai, and victim is presented by V. the dotted 
line represents a particular attack path between an 
attacker and the victim. The attack path from attacker Ai 
to victim V is a unique ordered list of routers between Ai 
and V. for instance, if attack originates from A1, then to 
reach V it must traverses the routers R1, R3, R5, R6 as 
shown by the dashed line. When victim V detects an 
intrusion, the trace back problem is to identify nodes R6, 







Figure 2. A network from attackers to victim 
 
Analyzing the trace back of attack is a highly complex 
problem. Several approaches have been proposed to solve 
this problem of trace back in literature [5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 
16]: 
• Packet filtering approach implemented via ingress 
and egress filtering by service providers can provide 
some degree of tracking of an attacker. 
• Backscatter trace back tracks back a flood of packets 
targeting a DDOS victim. 
• Probabilistic approaches for packet tracing such as 
iTrace include sending special packets on the 
network to identify the source of an attack.  
• Hop by Hop tracing- A tracing program running 
near the victim identifies the attack packet by 
comparing the packet’s source Internet packet (IP) 
address with the routing table information and 
sending a warning to its upstream router which upon 
encountering such a packet sends a notification to its 
upstream router and this goes on recursively until the 
source. 
• Internet overlay network- An overlay network 
consisting of IP tunnels between edge routers and 
tracking routers is built and the tracking routers are 
vested with special diagnostic tools capable of 
performing the tracing.  
A detailed survey of various trace back approaches 
can be found in [4,11,12]. A number of limitations exist 
in current approaches for identifying the origin of an 
attack and one of them is tracing the packet stream 
through a number of stepping stone hosts, which tend to 
keep the attacker sheltered from identification. The key 
limiting factors of existing approaches include: 
• All the approaches attempt the trace back using step-
by-step backward trace from victim to attacker. 
• All the approaches use same IP network for trace 
back as the attackers use for attacking. 
• Most of the approaches require changes or additions 
in the existing routing protocols. 
• Most of them operate in active mode and could be 
evaded by the attackers easily. 
• Most of the approaches have high memory 
requirement, high routing overhead and high 
detection latency. 
• Most of the approaches cannot detect attacks across 
stepping stone or zombie nodes accurately. 
In this paper, we present a new IP marking technique 
to solve the IP traceback problem. Our approach is using 
IP record route option to probabilistically mark packets 
with entire path information as they arrive at the routers 
and use a Wireless Overlay Network (WON) to store the 
router address list once the IP record route option is full. 
Because each marked packet represents the entire path it 
has traversed, with a single such packet a victim can 
reconstruct the entire path. Our approach may be 
incrementally deployed, and is backward compatible with 
the existing infrastructure. We describe a marking and 
reconstruction algorithm that has fixed computation 
overhead and no false positive. Furthermore, we 
demonstrate our approach can handle distributed Dos 
attacks very well and the volume of attack packets needed 
to reconstruct the attack path is controlled by victim, and 
all above functionalities don’t need support from ISP or 
knowledge of network topology.      
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 provides related work and section 3 outlines our basic 
approach and characterizes marking and reconstruction 
algorithms for implementing it. In section 4, we detail 
evaluation of our approach and comparison to other 
probabilistic packet marking approaches. Finally; in 
section 5 we conclude and summarize our findings. 
 
2. Related work 
Recently Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) [8,14] 
and PPM based approaches have been proposed for 
tracing the source. While PPM has the advantages of 
efficiency and easy implementability over deterministic 
packet marking and router based logging and messaging, 
it has the potential drawback that an attacker may 
impede traceback by sending packets with spoofed 
marking field values as well as spoofed source IP 
addresses. The following sub section will review two well 
known PPM based approaches and their limitations. 
 
2.1. Probabilistic Packet Marking 
This scheme is based on the idea that routers mark 
packets that pass through them with their full addresses 
or a part of their addresses. Packets for marking are 
selected randomly with some predefined probability. As 
the victim receives the marked packets, it can reconstruct 
the full path. 
Node sampling samples the path one node at a time. 
A single static “node” field is reserved in the packet 
header, upon receiving a packet, each router chooses to 
write its address in the node field with a certain 
predefined probability p. after enough such packets are 
sent, the victim would have received at least one sample 
for every router in the attack path and the victim can 
reconstruct the attack path using such samples. However, 
this method has two serious limitations: first, routers are 
that far away from the victim contribute fewer samples 
and random variability can easily lead to disordering; 
secondly, if there are multiple attackers, then multiple 
routers may exist at the same distance making detection 
of attack more difficult. Therefore, this approach is not 
robust for DDoS.   This approach has a number of 
limitations: 
• Large volume of packets needed to reconstruct the 
attack path. 
• Large computation overhead to path reconstruction. 
• Large number of false positives. 
• Can not handle major DDoS. 
 
2.2. Adjusted PPM 
In PPM and AAM, the routers far away from victim 
contribute fewer packets for path reconstruction. 
Adjusted PPM [15] uses an additional field in the IP 
header called IP Option field to record number of hops 
traversed by the packet. Packet is marked 
probabilistically proportional to the inverse of this 
distance. The farther the router is from victim, the higher 
probability it marks the packets. This significantly 
reduces the number of packets needed for path 
reconstruction. The approach has several limitations: 
• It has low scalability. 
• It is bad for DDoS handling. 
 
3. WON for Probabilistic Packet Marking 
Before we introduce our marking approach, we will 
give a brief introduction to the terminology used in the 
article.   
IP Record Route Option: The record route option 
allows the source to create an empty list of IP addresses 
and arrange for each router that handles the packet to 
add its IP address to the list. Figure 3 shows the format of 
the record route option. 
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Figure 3. The format of the record route option 
 
As described above, the CODE field contains the 
option number and option class (7 for record route). The 
LENGTH field specifies the total length of the option as 
it appears in the IP packet, including the first three 
octets. The fields starting with one labeled First IP 
address comprise the area reserved for recording router 
addresses. The POINTER field specifies the offset within 
the option of the next available slot. 
DIR: DIR is a Double Interface Router equipped with 
both wired and wireless interfaces. Wireless routers with 
Internet connection sharing, networking and firewall 
features are an alternative to hard wired routers or 
networking software. Wireless routers are actually wired 
routers with wireless access points built in so it can have 
wired and/or wireless functionality at the same time [17]. 
WON: WON is Wireless Overlay Network built on 
top of existing network; a WON contains wireless nodes.  
Partition: A network can be divided into partitions 
based on the coverage of the wireless node in WON. 
Each partition contains all the routers in the coverage 
area of one wireless node, and each wireless node can 
communicate with the DIRs in the partition. 
Boundary Router: any router which has a link to a 














Figure 4. The architecture of WON 
 
Our marking algorithm is similar to the IP Record 
Route Option [18] where each router’s address is 
appended to the end of the packet as it travels through 
the network from attacker to victim. Consequently, the 
marked packet received by the victim has a unique 
complete ordered list of the routers it traversed. 
The IP Record Route Option has two serious 
limitations: first, it has high router overhead by 
appending each router’s address to the packet; secondly, 
the distance from attacker to the victim is unknown a 
priori, so it’s impossible to reserve enough space in the 
packet for the complete list of the routers. 
To solve above limitations, we introduce the following 
architecture first. Figure 4 depicts a simple wired 
network having two partitions p1 and p2, and a wireless 
overlay network containing two wireless nodes N1 and 
N2. Partition p1 has routers R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5 of 
which R1 and R5 are boundary routers, R1 has a link to 
attacker A and R5 has a link to partition p2; partition p2 
has routers R6, R7, R8, R9, R10, and R11 of which R6 
and R11 are boundary routers, R6 has a link to R5 in 
partition p1 and R11 has a link to victim V. Wireless 
node N1 monitors partition p1 and N2 monitors partition 
p2. The dashed line represents the attack path from the 
attacker to the victim, and the dotted line connecting 
each wireless node and wireless nodes to partitions 
indicate the communication link is wireless link. Our 
approach has following assumptions: 
• The network is already partitioned. 
• The wireless link is stable. 
• Each partition has a partition ID. 
• Each router knows which partition it belongs to 
because each router need inscribe partition ID 
into packet for path reconstruction. 
To reduce router overhead, we probabilistically mark 
packet: in an attack path from the attacker to the victim, 
if router R is the first router following the attack source, 
upon receiving a packet w, R will generate a random 
number in (0, 1), if this random number is greater than 
predefined probability p, then R will open IP record route 
option and append its IP address to the end of the packet, 
and each following router along the attach path will 
append its IP address to the end of the packet after the 
first router R opens the IP record route option. When a 
packet w arrives at the victim, packet w is either 
unmarked or marked with a complete ordered list of 
routers along the path. In Figure 4, attack packets are 
originated from A, to reach victim V, each packet will 
traverse along the path R1-R2-R3-R5-R6-R7-R10-R11, 
in the attack path, R1 is the first router after attacker, 
once R1 decides to mark a packet, all other routers R2, 
R3, R5, R6, R7, R10, R11 should mark the packet also.  
The distance between attacker and victim is unknown 
a priori, it’s unsure that how much space in the packet 
should be reserved for the complete list of routers. The 
maximal internet header is 60 octets, the record route IP 
option header is 3 octets, a typical internet header is 20 
octets [18], in our approach we reserve one octet for 
inscribing partition ID (one octet can represent 28 = 256 
partitions, this number is enough), now the format of 
record route option is depicted in Figure 5, one octet field 
PART_ID is used to store the ID of the partition where 
packet resides currently, when each router appends its IP 
address to the end of the packet it will also inscribe 
current partition ID into PART_ID field. If there are no 
other IP options in use, the maximum number of IP 
addresses that the IP record route option can contain is 
(60-20-3-1)/4 = 9. 








Figure 5. The format of the record route option 
Our approach introduces WON to store the marking 
information: each wireless node of WON maintains a 
table stored in its memory, the record tuple has elements 
<packet_ID, previous_part_ID, partial_attack_path>, 
packet_ID is the ID of the packet, previous_part_ID is 
the partition ID that this packet came from, and 
partial_attack_path is attack path of the entire attack path 
that this packet has traversed.   
The architecture in Figure 4 has two parts: one part is 
partition which consists of boundary routers and center 
routers; the other part is WON. The basic approach is 
when a packet w reaches an ingress boundary router R 
and R decides to mark w, before marking R it should 
notify WON from which partition packet w is coming 
and the packet ID of w, WON will store the information 
into previous_part_ID and packet_ID. When packet w 
reaches a egress boundary router R’, after marking R’ 
should notify WON to store the partial path of packet w 
traversed into partial_attack_path, and then router R’ 
should clear the list of IP addresses stored in IP record 
route option. If IP record route option is full when packet 
w reaches a center DIR router R’’, R’’ should notify 
WON to store partial attack path before it marks the 
packet. Each time when a router clears the IP addresses 
list of record route option, the router should write the 
latest IP address of IP addresses list into the First IP 
address field of record route option, and then append its 
address to the Second IP address field; this makes it easy 
to append two adjacent partial paths together. The 
communication between WON and partitions requires 
boundary routers and certain center routers are DIRs. 
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Putting aside for the moment the difficulty in deciding 
which certain center routers should be DIRs, this 
algorithm is efficient to implement. Use Figure 4 as an 
example to understand thoroughly the entire algorithm 
it’s better for us to assume the IP record route option 
reserves space for only three IP addresses (in real 
implementation, the reserved space should be enough for 
nine IP addresses), the Table 1 provides the packet 





4. Evaluation and Comparison of PPM Based 
 Approaches 
We will evaluate our approach using the following 
metrics: 
Number of attacking packets needed for traceback: 
the number of attacking packets needed for traceback in 
our scheme is 
p
1
 where p is probability of a router 
marks a packet. In [8] the suggested number of p is 0.04, 
PPM and advanced and authenticated packet marking 
[13] need thousands of packets; other PPM based 
approaches such as adjusted PPM, DDoS Scounter 
[15][16] need hundreds of packets; but our scheme only 
need very few packets for traceback. Compared to PPM 
and PPM based approaches, our approach has another 
advantage: the number of packets needed for traceback is 
only related to probability which is decided by victim in 
our approach; in PPM and other PPM based approaches, 





 where d is the distance between attacker 
and victim, this formula is related to both probability and 
distance, even if probability is decided by victim, but the 
distance is under control of attacker.    
Path reconstruction overhead: in our approach we 
use IP record route option to mark the packets, one such 
marked packet can reconstruct the entire path, and the 
list of IP addresses is ordered. Once a detection system 
indentifies attacks, the system needs one step 
communication with WON to get the ordered list of IP 
addresses and append each partial attack path together in 
order of pervious_part_ID, there is no additional 
computation overhead incurred. PPM and other PPM 
based approaches inscribe a single node IP address or 
partial attack path into the packets; they require a large 
volume of combinations to reconstruct the attack path. 
Ability to handle major DDoS attacks: the table 
stored in WON has tuple <packet_ID, previous_part_ID, 
partial_attack_path>; such tuple uniquely defines a 
record. Even distributed attackers reside in the network 
and all attackers are treated in the same manner even if 
they are far away from the victim. The combined 
information of packet_ID, previous_part_ID, and 
partial_attack_path can identify them.  
Number of false positive: the attack path is 
reconstructed by detection system requesting WON for 
marking information, each marking record stored in 
WON is uniquely defined by tuple <packet_ID, 
previous_part_ID, partial_attack_path>, it’s impossible 
for two attack packets to have the same tuple, so our 
approach has zero false positives.  
Fragmentation handling: our approach uses IP 
record route option to mark the packets, the field used for 
fragmentation in IP header is 16-bits IDENTIFICATION 
field which is not changed in our approach, so this 
approach can handle packet fragmentation. 
Scalability: our approach is highly scalable; it does 
not need additional configuration on other devices to add 
a single device to the scheme. If the router added is a 
double interface router, then it requires a radio link 
assignment to communicate with WON, and such 
requirement does not change the network.   
Incremental deployment: To deploy the scheme, 
vendors need to implement two functions: marking and 
reconstruction functions. Once the marking function is 
available, it can perform traceback within the ISPs that 
deploy it. 
ISP involvement: each router needs marking 
function, upgrade of such software on routers is 
straightforward: once routers are upgraded, the marking 
Marking procedure at router R: 
For each packet w 
If record route option of w is close 
Let x be a random number from (0, 1); 
If x<p then, 
Open record route option of w; 
packet_ID - 16-bit ID of IP header; 
previous_part_ID - null; 
PART_ID - current partition ID; 
Mark R to IP record route option; 
Else 
If R is ingress boundary router 
packet_ID - 16-bit ID of IP header; 
previous_part_ID - PART_ID;  
PART_ID - current partition ID; 
Mark R to IP record route option; 
If R is egress boundary router 
Mark R to IP record route option; 
partial_attack_path - option list; 
Clear option list; 
If option list is full 
partial_attack_path - option list; 
Clear option list; 
Mark R to IP record route option; 
 
Path reconstruction procedure at victim V: 
For each marked packet w received at V 
Request WON to report information for w 
Sort routers according to previous_part_ID 
 
Figure 6. Packet marking algorithm 
function on each router is enabled, this requires very few 
ISP involvement. 
Knowledge of topology: the path reconstruction 
procedure happens between detection system and WON, 
there is no need for detection system to know the network 
topology. 
The following table gives a detailed comparison of 
various PPM approaches.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this article we present an IP trace back scheme 
which is more efficient than the schemes available up to 
now. In contrast to previous work, our techniques have 
significantly higher precision (no false positive) and very 
lower path reconstruction overhead for the victim to 
reconstruct the attack paths under large scale DDoS.   
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